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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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This paper documents the prevalence of in-house 
generation of electric power by firms in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and attempts to identify the underlying causes. 
The analysis is based on two data sources. The UDI 
World Electric Power Plants Data Base (WEPP), a 
global inventory of electric power generating units, 
provides a detailed inventory of in-house generation at 
the country level. The World Bank’s Enterprise Survey 
Database captures business perceptions of the obstacles to 
enterprise growth for 8,483 currently operating firms in 
25 African countries. 
   Overall, so-called own generation by firms—which has 
been on the rise in recent years—accounts for about 6 
percent of installed generation capacity in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (equivalent to at least 4,000 MW of installed 
capacity). However, this share doubles to around 12 
This paper—a product of the African Sustainable Development Front Office, Africa Region—is part of a larger effort in 
the region to gauge the status of public expenditure, investment needs, financing sources, and sector performance in the 
main infrastructure sectors for 24 African focus countries, including energy, information and communication technologies, 
irrigation, transport, and water and sanitation. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.
worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at jirving@worldbank.org.  
percent in the low-income countries, the post-conflict 
countries, and more generally on the Western side of 
the continent. In a handful of countries own generation 
represents more than 20 percent of capacity. 
   Rigorous empirical analysis shows that unreliable 
public power supplies is far from being the only or even 
the largest factor driving generator ownership. Firm 
characteristics have a major influence—in particular, 
the probability of owning a generator doubles in large 
firms relative to small ones. Our model predicts that the 
prevalence of own generation would remain high (at 
around 20 percent) even if power supplies were perfectly 
reliable, suggesting that other factors, such as emergency 
back-up and export regulations, play a critical role in the 
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he performance of Africa’s power supply sector on the continent is woefully unsatisfactory. 
Most of the continent’s power companies are unreliable sources of supply, inefficient users of 
generating capacity, deficient in maintenance, erratic in the procurement of spare parts, and unable to 
staunch losses in transmission and distribution. They also have failed to provide adequate electricity 
services to the majority of the region’s population, especially to rural communities, the urban poor, and 
small and medium enterprises.  
T 
 Three-quarters of the electricity produced on the continent comes from South Africa and North 
Africa; only 26 percent is generated in Sub-Saharan Africa (without South Africa), where power is 
produced by small, inefficient systems. The problem is not limited to the supply side. Popular demand for 
power is very low. Net electricity consumption in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) is about 
163kWh per capita—about 40 percent of the level in South Asia and 20 percent of the level in Latin 
America (figure 1).  
In response to the endemic unreliability of 
Africa’s national electric power utilities, self-
generated electricity has become an increasingly 
important source of power. Many end users of 
electricity, from households to large enterprises, 
now generate their own power by operating small 
to medium-sized plants with capacities ranging 
from 1MW to about 700MW (Karekezi and 
Kimani 2002). For small-scale enterprises, 
protection against erratic supply from public 
utilities often means installing small (less than 
5MW) thermal generators.  
These adjustments are not without cost, 
however. Self-generated electricity is generally 
more expensive than electricity from the public grid, as we shall see, which limits its potential as a 
permanent substitute for unreliable public supply. Because it adds to the capital and operating costs of 
doing business, in-house generation affects the range of investment available to budding entrepreneurs, 
raises production costs, lowers the competitiveness of local products, and blocks the achievement of 
economies of scale.  
Figure 1  Per capita consumption of electricity, by 







































Source: IEA 2007.  
The limitations of  own generation do not mean that there are not gains to be had from the 
decentralization of power generation.  
Historically, the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity have been characterized by 
increasing returns to scale, and the electric power industry has been viewed as a vertically integrated 
“natural monopoly,” with a sole supplier in each region. Recent econometric studies have shown, 
however, that scale economies in the generation of electric power level off once the generator reaches a 
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size of about 500 MW.
1 This means that the generation of electric power may be, under some 
circumstances, a competitive activity, even if transmission and distribution networks are indeed natural 
monopolies. Moreover, separating transmission and distribution from generation and introducing 
competition into the generation business may increase the overall efficiency of the electric power sector. 
But in no African country have the legal and institutional conditions for decentralized power 
generation yet reached the point where decentralization can provide an alternative to unreliable supply 
from monopolistic public providers or to the use of expensive generators at the firm level.
2  
Some 20 African countries are currently initiating some form of power sector reform. Although most 
are still in the initial phases of privatization and restructuring, the contemplated changes reflect a 
profound questioning of the principles that have governed the sector since the early 1960s. Some 
countries, including the Arab Republic of Egypt and South Africa, have had unbundled power sectors for 
a long time and are now thinking of introducing private participation. Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana introduced 
reforms (privatization and restructuring) in the early and mid-1990s, respectively (Karekezi and Mutiso 
1999).  
For the time being, Africa’s firms, small and large, must cope with unreliable power supplies.  
1    The economic literature on unreliable power 
It is fairly settled in the literature that unreliable power supply results in welfare losses (see Kessides 1993 
and references therein). But the empirical research on the economic costs of power outages and  own 
generation in developing countries remains limited, owing to the lack of appropriate microeconomic panel 
data that could be used to infer firms’ and households’ response to poor provision of electricity supply.
3 
Only two studies have recently been done on this subject in Africa. Adenikinju (2005) analyzed the 
economic cost of power outages in Nigeria. Using the revealed preference approach on business survey 
data (Bental and Ravid 1982; Caves, Herriges, and Windle 1992; Beenstock, Goldin, and Haitovsky 
1997), Adenikinju estimated the marginal cost of power outages to be in the range of $0.94 to $3.13 per 
kWh of lost electricity. Given the poor state of electricity supply in Nigeria Adenikinju (2005) concluded 
that power outages imposed significant costs on business. Small-scale operators were found to be most 
heavily affected by the infrastructure failures.
4 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Christensen and Greene (1976), Joskow (1987), and Wolak (2001). 
2 Since 1980, when Chile began its radical program of restructuring and privatization, more than 70 countries have 
introduced reforms of electric power (Besant-Jones 2006). Most of the reforms have sought to promote private 
ownership and investment, and hence to reduce the dominance of the state-owned, vertically integrated enterprise, 
which up to that point had been ubiquitous in the sector. These reforms have varied greatly. Some countries have 
invited private investment in generation only, financed by long-term contracts with state-owned utilities (as in 
China, India, Indonesia, and Mexico). Some have vertically separated the industry while privatizing only part of it 
(as in Colombia, El Salvador, Kazakhstan, and New Zealand). Others have privatized the entire industry, creating 
competitive generation markets, as in Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom (World Bank 2004).  
3 Cross-country aggregate data analysis, widely used in the development economics literature, cannot avoid 
simultaneity between poor infrastructure and welfare. 
4 Lee and Anas (1992) also found that poor infrastructure had a negative effect on small enterprises in Nigeria. 
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Reinikka and Svensson (2002) analyzed the impact of poor provision of public capital goods on firm 
performance in Uganda. Using a discrete choice model on business survey data, the authors predicted that 
unreliable power supply causes firms to substitute complementary capital (for backup generators) for 
deficient public services. Estimating investment equations on the same data, they found that poor 
complementary public capital significantly reduced private investment.  
Reconciling the results of the two studies is difficult. Both rely on limited datasets from business 
surveys done in a single country. Both use only a small number of factors among the many that firms 
might consider in choosing to generate their own power. Neither accounts for effects that may change the 
provision of power supply. And the estimated marginal costs of electricity and effects of unreliable power 
supply on firms’ investment may be biased because of the failure to address the possible endogeneity in 
choice of generator, provision of electricity supply, and other observed explanatory variables, such as 
firms’ profitability and access to finance, and the country’s industrial structure.  
This paper combines the advantages of cross-country data analysis with microeconomic analysis of 
business survey data. Use of a cross-country dataset can help to identify the effects that affect the 
provision of power supply, and to some extent, changes in the industrial structure. Microeconomic data 
can be used to infer firms’ and households’ response to provision of electricity supply. Because our study 
relies on cross-sectional data, the bias in estimates cannot be fully avoided. However, cross-country 
comparisons will still be valid, given the one-dimensional direction of bias.  
The central purpose of this study is to examine the national and firm-level costs of unreliable power 
supplies and  own generation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Our specific objectives are:  
  To describe power outages and the phenomenon of  own generation of electric power in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
  To estimate the economic costs of both phenomena at the national and firm levels.  
  To explore why firms decide to generate their own power. 
  To evaluate the effect of improving the reliability of power supplies on firms’ in-house generation.  
  To suggest how unreliable power supply might shape the economic structure of Sub-Saharan African 
economies. 
We do not investigate whether the share of  own generation is growing in Africa or compare the 
phenomenon as it is practiced on the continent to own-generation patterns (and their costs and benefits) 
elsewhere in the world. 
2    The data on self-generated electricity  
Our analysis is based on two data sources. The first is the UDI World Electric Power Plants Data 
Base (WEPP), a global inventory of electric power generating units.
5 WEPP contains design data for 
                                                 
5 WEPP is issued quarterly by the UDI Products Group of PLATTS, the energy information division of McGraw-
Hill. For more information, see the WEPP database manual, available at http://wepp.platts.com. 
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2,843 plants currently operating and 941 plants under construction of all sizes and technologies operated 
by regulated utilities, private power companies, and industrial firms that produce their own electricity in 
47 Sub-Saharan African countries. WEPP provides highly representative data that account for 87 percent 
of the variation in total generating capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa (figure 2). A plant-level database that 
provides rich information on technical and spatial power-supply characteristics, WEPP nevertheless lacks 
important accounting variables necessary for structural microeconomic analysis.
6 Therefore its primary 
function here is to provide an aggregate picture of the own-generation phenomenon in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
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Source: UDI World Electric Power Plants Data Base (WEPP). 
 
Our second data source is the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey Database, which captures business 
perceptions of the obstacles to enterprise growth, the relative importance of various constraints to 
increasing employment and productivity, and the effects of a country’s investment climate on the 
international competitiveness its firms. The database contains data for 8,483 currently operating firms in 
25 North and Sub-Saharan African countries sampled from the universe of registered businesses. It uses a 
stratified random sampling methodology.
7 Because in most countries the number of small and medium 
enterprises is far greater than the number of large firms, surveys generally oversample large 
establishments. The main advantage of the Enterprise Survey Database is that it provides both managers’ 
opinions concerning the reliability of power supplies and the accounting data needed for structural 
microeconomic analysis. However, because enterprise survey data are based on relatively small samples 
(ranging from 60 to 850 businesses), they are less useful for macroeconomic analysis.  
Despite obvious sampling differences, there exists some overlap between WEPP and the enterprise 
surveys. Figures 3–7 provide some consistency checks between the enterprise survey dataset and the 
WEPP data on industrial firms that produce their own electricity. Figures 3 and 4 show the distributions 
                                                 
6 The most important variables for structural microeconomic analysis are the price, sales, and cost data.  
7 Detailed information on the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey Database can be found at 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.  
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of installed generation capacities.
8 It can be seen that WEPP dataset does not take into account the 
fraction of firms that have the smallest generation capacity (less than 50kW), which are very difficult to 
detect. On the contrary, the enterprise survey dataset underrepresents the fraction of firms with medium-
size and large installed capacities (greater than 5MW), because of the random sampling procedure used to 
select participating enterprises. The distributions of installed generating capacities fully overlap in the 
range between 50kW and 1MW, which accounts for 35 percent of participating firms in WEPP dataset 
and 39 percent of participating firms in enterprise survey dataset.  
Figures 5 and 6 show the distributions in observed industrial structure of firms with installed 
generation capacities between 50kW and 5MW. There are considerable similarities between two datasets. 
Both comprise a significant share of agricultural industry (23 percent and 29 percent of firms, 
respectively), metals and mining (14 percent and 26 percent of firms), and chemical products and 
petroleum (12 percent and 8 percent of firms). Both also have relatively small and significant shares of 
hotels and restaurants (4 percent and 3 percent of firms), construction and cement (6 percent and 4 percent 
of firms), and wood and pulp (8 percent and 2 percent of firms). The major differences include a large 
share of textiles industry in the enterprise survey dataset
9 (20 percent of firms), and a large share of 
unidentified plants (20 percent of firms) in the WEPP dataset.
10  
Figure 3  Distribution of electrical generating capacity 
in Africa according to Enterprise Survey Database, 
2002–06 
Figure 4  Distribution of electrical generating 
capacity in Africa according to UDI World Electric 













































Sources: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Database; UDI World Electric Power Plants Data Base (WEPP). 
                                                 
8 The enterprise survey does not ask for information on generating capacity, which is estimated at firm level by 
taking the ratio of the deflated generator’s acquisition cost to the average capital cost per kW of the generator’s 
capacity (assuming thermal generation). The data for the capital cost per kW of installed capacity came from the 
World Bank’s Energy and Water Department (2005). The GDP deflator data came from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database.  
9 The textiles industry is oversampled in the enterprise survey dataset for the purpose of international productivity 
comparisons.  
10 Unidentified industries in the WEPP dataset may comprise multiproduct corporations, and smaller firms that 
choose not to reveal their commercial activities. 
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Figure 5  Sectoral distribution of firms in World 
Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, 2002–06 
Figure 6  Sectoral distribution of firms in UDI World 
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Sources: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Database; UDI World Electric Power Plants Data Base (WEPP). 
 
The age distribution of installed generators is generally similar in the two data sources (figure 7), 
although the enterprise survey dataset has a higher share of recently purchased generators. This finding is 
not surprising, given that the WEPP dataset comprises a greater share of large generators that have a 
longer lifespan. Oil and gas are the most common fuels used by commercial and industrial enterprises 
with generating capacities of 50kW to 5MW (figure 8). The predominance of thermal generation (oil, gas, 
and biomass) in the WEPP database validates the assumption of thermal generation made in the enterprise 
survey dataset.  































































Sources: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Database; UDI World Electric Power Plants Data Base (WEPP). 
 
We also make use of other sources of information, such as the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database, the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) International Energy Annual 2004, and the 
United Nation Statistical Division’s (UNSD) Commodity Trade (COMTRADE) database.  
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3    The extent of  own generation in Africa 
In-house generation of electrical power accounts for only around 6 percent of the installed generating 
capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa (table 1).
11 This is a bit more than the share in the United States (3.7 
percent) and about the same level as in the enlarged European Union (7.3 percent).
12  
There is a considerable variation in the scope and size of in-house generation across Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The trade-adjusted share of  own generation in countries where it exceeds 1 percent is shown in 
figure 9.
13 In most Sub-Saharan countries,  own generation represents less than 10 percent of the installed 
capacity. In three countries, however, it accounts for more than 25 percent of installed capacity, and for 
10–25 percent in nine others.  
Table 1  Distribution of installed electrical generating capacity, by region, income group, and conflict status, 2006 
Percentage shares of total 
Self-generation, by sector   
Total MW 
Utility / 






 Central  Africa  5,639.29  92.33  5.33  1.52  0.83 
 East  Africa  2,731.07  92.07  2.95  3.32  1.66 
  West  Africa  14,080.21 82.87 10.62  2.01  6.28 
 South  Africa  50,352.16  97.47  0.99  1.41  0.13 
Income groups 
 Low  Income  26,357.53  88.19  6.82  2.27  3.67 
 Lower-middle-income  3,971.91  94.23  3.27  1.40  1.09 
 Upper-middle-income  42,473.29  97.66  1.05  1.21  0.07 
Conflict status 
 Nonconflict    54,652.76  96.43  2.04  1.43  0.18 
  Conflict / postconflict  18,149.97  86.86  6.94  2.14  5.21 
Africa total  72,802.73 94.05  3.26  1.60  1.43 
Source: UDI World Electric Power Plants Data Base (WEPP). 
 
                                                 
11 The estimates are based on the assumption that 100 percent of installed capacity is functional. In most countries of 
Sub-Saharan Africa this is not the case, and in many it is as low as 50 percent. Because exact statistics for each 
country are not available, the size of the observed phenomenon is downward biased. The size of the bias in the share 
of own-generation capacity in the country's total generation portfolio may vary by half or double. 
12 U.S. Department of Energy, http://www.doe.org; EUROSTAT, http://www.eurostat.europa.eu.  
13 The results reported in figures 9 and 10 are based on the WEPP dataset and hence underestimate the value of small 
generators (less than 100 kW). The size of the bias is too small (about 250 kW per country) to make any significant 
changes in the ratios of capacity to GDP and capacity to gross fixed capital formation. 
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Source: UDI World Electric Power Plants Data Base (WEPP).Country data on annual electricity imports came from IEA’s 
International Energy Annual 2004. Flow data were converted to generating capacity assuming continuous, uninterrupted annual 
consumption of imported electricity at an average peak load factor of 0.65.  
 
The estimated startup value of in-house generating capacity, expressed as a percentage of the GNI 
and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in Sub-Saharan African countries is shown in figure 10. For 
most countries, the value of  own generation relative to the size of their economies is not large. However, 
for five countries (Mauritius, Congo Republic, Mauritania, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe) it is greater than 4 
percent of GNI, and for another five countries (Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Ghana, Malawi, and Togo) it 
ranges between 2–3 percent of GNI. Figure 12 also shows that for three countries (Mauritius, Congo 
Republic, and Swaziland), the value of  own generation accounts for more than 20 percent of GFCF, and 
for five countries (Mauritania, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Malawi, and Togo) about 10 percent of GFCF.  
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Source: UDI World Electric Power Plants Data Base (WEPP); World Bank 2005; World Bank, World Development Indicators 
database. 
Note: The start-up value of installed capacity was estimated at the individual plant level by the product of the plant’s capacity (in kW) 
and capital cost per kW of installed capacity, and then aggregated at the country level. The data for capital cost per kW of installed 
capacity (for different technology types) came from the World Bank’s Energy and Water Department (2005). The value of  own 
generation as a percentage of GNI is either too small or missing for the countries not reported in the figure. 
 
Annual gross additions to own-generated capacity are shown in figure 11 as a share of total installed 
own-generation capacity. Consistent with the literature on investment in infrastructure (see, for example, 
Turvey 2002), the figure illustrates that capacity additions are indivisible, entailing lumpy investment. 
The largest additions to own-generation capacity occurred in 1994, 2000, 2002, and 2005. These spikes 
may reflect growing demand, coupled with adverse shocks in the supply of public power, such as 
economic recessions, armed conflicts, droughts, or increases in oil prices.  
The differences in size and scope of  own generation in Sub-Saharan Africa can be explained by 
various factors, including spatial characteristics, economic development, conflict status, and industrial 
structure (see table 1).  
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The own-generation phenomenon 
varies across the geopolitical regions 
of Sub-Saharan Africa (figure 12). It 
is significantly more prevalent in the 
15-country Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS).
14 In 
Mali, Ghana, and Togo  own 
generation accounts for more than 10 
percent of installed capacity; in 
Niger, Guinea, and Nigeria, the share 
exceeds 20 percent. In the regional 
context, the high shares of  own 
generation in Nigeria and Ghana—
the second- and fourth-largest 
electricity producers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa—are especially important.  
Figure 11  Additions to  own generation as a percentage of gross own-











































































Source: UDI World Electric Power Plants Data Base (WEPP). 
Own-generation is much more prevalent in low-income countries than elsewhere (figure 13).
15 The 
share of own-generated capacity in low-income countries is 12 percent, twice that of lower-middle-
income countries, and five times that of upper-middle-income countries. Of the 12 countries where  own 
generation accounts for more than 10 percent of installed capacity, 8 are low income. Low-income 
countries account for 74 percent of all own-generation capacity, with upper-middle-income countries 
accounting for all but 3 percent of the rest.  
Figure 12  Own-generation as share of total installed 
capacity, by subregion, 2006 
Figure 13  Own-generation as share of total installed 




















Low Income Low Middle Income Upper Middle
Income  
Source: UDI World Electric Power Plants Data Base (WEPP). 
Note: EAC = East African Community; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West Africa States; SADC = Southern African 
Development Community. 
 
                                                 
14 For a complete list of ECOWAS countries, see http://www.ecowas.info/. 
15 The income categories are defined according to the World Bank’s classification, available at 
www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm.  
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Countries that recently experienced or are currently involved in armed conflict have a higher share of  
own generation (see table 1).
16 Own-generation makes up 13 percent of installed capacity in these 
countries, compared with less than 4 percent in nonconflict countries. The share of  own generation is also 
about twice as high in manufacturing and about five times as high in commerce in conflict and 
postconflict countries than in nonconflict countries.  
There is a strong relationship between  own 
generation and industrial structure. Natural-
resource industries (oil extraction and mining) 
account for more than 50 percent of all own-
generation capacity (figure 14). The economies 
of most of the countries in which  own 
generation is prevalent are heavily dependent on 
natural-resource industries, whether mining 
(Mauritania, Niger, Guinea, Togo) or petroleum 
extraction and refining (Equatorial Guinea, 
Republic of Congo, Gabon, Nigeria). The 
causality of the relationship is difficult to 
predict. The high degree of asset specificity in 
mining and oil extraction industries, coupled 
with poor contract enforcement in Sub-Saharan 
African countries, can influence a firm’s decision to supply its own power, bundling together generation 
and extraction facilities (Joskow 1988). On the other hand, poor public provision affects countries’ 
international competitiveness and enhances their specialization in low-value-added industries (Dollar, 
Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae 2005). 
Figure 14  Own-generation as a share of installed capacity, 

















Source: UDI World Electric Power Plants Data Base (WEPP). 
Sugar processing accounts for 15 percent of all  own generation, reflecting the heavy use of electricity 
cogeneration agro-based industries. Cogeneration offers substantial opportunities for generating 
electricity with limited capital investments, while avoiding the negative environmental effects of 
increased fossil fuel combustion (Karekezi and Kithyoma 2003). Thus, countries with a large domestic 
sugar industry, such as Swaziland and Mauritius, have high rates of  own generation. 
Own-generation plants differ from public utilities in technological aspects, such as capacity and fuel 
type. Public utilities are much larger than own-generation plants (figure 15). About half of the capacity of 
public utilities is provided by large (500–1,000MW) plants. The average capacity of own-generation 
plants is about ten times smaller (10–100MW). Most public utilities rely for fuel on coal (in the Southern 
African Development Community) or hydropower (in East and Central Africa), whereas most own-
generation plants, as already noted, are thermal (oil, gas, and biomass) (figure 16).  
                                                 
16 Information on countries in armed conflicts was taken from Ploughshares’ Armed Conflicts Report (2006), 
available at http://www.ploughshares.ca/.  
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Figure 15  Installed capacity of public utilities and 
own-generators, by plant size, 2006 
Figure 16   Installed capacity of public utilities and 











100-500 MW 10-100 MW 1-10 MW <1 MW








Hydro (%) Oil (%) Gas (%) Coal (%) Other (%)
Government / Utility Plants Own Generation
Source: UDI World Electric Power Plants Data Base (WEPP). 
4    What drives firms to generate their own power?  
To explain why  own generation 
is more prevalent in some countries 
than in others, we estimated a cross-
country linear regression model. 
The share of  own generation was 
expressed as a function of wealth 
(GNI per capita), public capital 
(gross fixed capital formation), 
power sector characteristics (total 
access to electricity, energy 
intensity, share of electricity 
generated by hydroelectric plants, 
and diesel fuel price), economic 
structure (share of manufacturing, 
agriculture, and services in GNI), 
conflict status, and regional 
controls. The results are reported in 
table 2.  
The estimated regression has an 
acceptable goodness of fit (the R
2 is 
equal to 49 percent), and is significant overall (the p-value associated with the F-statistic is 0.01). 
Although almost all estimated coefficients have the expected signs, only three statistically significant 
relationships were found. GNI per capita and conflict status were found to be negatively related to the 
Table 2   Share of  own generation in national installed capacity 




GNI per capita (USD, log)  –0.058
* 0.07
Gross fixed capital formation (% GNI)  –0.005  0.13
Total access to electricity (% population)  0.002  0.25
Energy intensity, (btu / USD, log)   0.024  0.37
Price of diesel fuel (USD / liter)  –0.001  0.41
Share of hydro plants in total generation ( percent)  0.058  0.55
Share of agriculture in GNI ( percent)  –0.003  0.27
Share of manufacturing in GNI ( percent)  0.005
*** 0.01
Region: SADC  –0.064  0.30
Region: ECOWAS  –0.022  0.65
Region: EAC  0.038  0.64
Conflict or postconflict country (1=“Yes”)  –0.100
** 0.04




2  0.49 
N  45 
*** statistically significant at 1 percent level; ** statistically significant at 5 percent; 
level; * statistically significant at 10 percent level 
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share of  own generation. The share of manufacturing in GNI was positively associated with the degree of  
own generation.
17  
The World Bank’s enterprise surveys offer clues to why firms elect to generate their own power. 
Because deficiencies in the provision of public power impede business operations, firms install their own 
generating equipment to protect themselves against power outages.
18  
Power outages have a significant effect on business operations. Firms that experienced few power 
outages (fewer than 30 days per annum) tended to declare that electricity was not an obstacle or was only 
a minor obstacle for the operation and growth of their businesses. On the other hand, firms that suffered 
frequent outages (more than 60 days per annum) tended to believe that electricity was a major or very 
severe obstacle for the operation and growth of their businesses.  
Frequent power outages result in significant losses for enterprises in terms of forgone sales and 
damaged equipment. Firms experiencing frequent power outages (more than 60 days per year) lose 10–12 
percent of their sales (figure 17). This is about twice as high as the figure for firms that have few outages 
(less than 15 days per year). Equipment damage traceable to power outages is about twice as high for 
firms that suffer frequent outages as for firms that suffer few outages (1 percent of sales compared to 0.5 
percent of sales) (figure 18).  
Figure 17   Sales lost owing to power outages 
Percent 





























































































































Source: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Database. 
 
The size and the scope of  own generation is higher for firms that experience frequent power outages. 
Firms that experience frequent power outages are about twice as likely to have their own generator as 
firms that have few power outages (figure 19). The share of electricity produced in-house increases 
sharply among firms that have frequent power outages (8–14 percent), compared with other firms (4–6 
percent).  
                                                 
17 The estimated coefficients reflect correlations, not causalities. Further analysis of the estimated relationship is 
impeded by the simultaneity of the choice of own-generation and the explanatory variables.  
18 Statistics from the Enterprise Surveys on power outages and the adoption of own-generation appear in appendix 1, 
tables 2a to 2f.  
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Other characteristics also affect the likelihood 
that a firm will choose to generate its own 
electricity. Size is one such characteristic. Larger 
firms are more likely to have their own generator 
and are more likely to have a generator of high 
capacity. Around half of medium size and large 
firms (those with 50 or more employees) have their 
own generator, compared with just 10 percent of 
small firms and micro enterprises (less than 10 
employees) (figure 20). The average capacity of the 
generators used by small firms is about one-third of 
those used by enterprises of medium size (10 to 100 
employees) and one-quarter of those used by large 
enterprises (more than 100 employees).  
Figure 19  Generator ownership by firms and share of 
electricity generated in-house, by frequency of power 
outages  
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The share of firms possessing their own generators varies significantly across manufacturing industries 
(figure 21).
19 In agriculture and construction, more than half of firms own a generator; in chemicals and 
nonmetal materials industries, the percentage is not far behind (between 40 and 50 percent). Own-
generation is also more prevalent among exporters and foreign-owned firms (appendix 1, tables 1d and 
1e). In nonmanufacturing industries, the share of firms owning a generator is very high in tourism, as one 
might expect (appendix 1, table 1f), and low in other service industries, such as wholesale and retail sales, 
as well as in IT services (appendix 1, table 1b). The share of firms owning a generator is especially low 
(about 5 percent) among informal enterprises (appendix 1, table 1f).  
To evaluate the extent to which reliability of power supply and firm characteristics affect the decision 
to generate electricity in-house, we employed the methodology laid out by Reinikka and Svensson (2002). 
We began with a stochastic specification,  
   
Pr Yi 1  1xi,2Zi   ,         ( 1 )  
 
where Yi is the estimated probability that firm i invests in a generator, Φ is the standard normal 
distribution function, xi is the frequency of power outages, and Zi is a vector of controls, including country 
and firm characteristics. 
Equation (1) is estimated using the probit method. Selected estimated parameters are presented in 
table 3, with the complete set appearing in appendix 1, table 2. Consistent with the analysis above, the 
reliability of power supply and various firm characteristics—age, size (as measured by number of 
employees), and export orientation) all have a significant positive impact on the estimated probability of 
investing in generating capacity. However, the impact of a firm’s size is much larger than that of power-
supply reliability. The size of the estimated coefficient on employment is about 6 times higher than that 
on the number of days of power outages.  
The probability that a firm will own a 
generator can be expressed as a function 
of the reliability of power supply and the 
firm’s size. The probability of finding a 
generator on the premises increases by 
nearly 50 percent as one moves from 
small firms (less than 10 employees) to 
very large ones (more than 500 
employees) (figure 22). The probability 
of having a generator remains high (about 
20 percent) even where power supply is 
completely reliable. For large firms the 
probability of having a generator in the 
absence of power outages is even higher (about 50 percent).  
Table 3  Probit regression results (generator ownership) 
Variable 
Estimated 
coefficient  P-value Elasticity 
Days of power outages (log)  0.06
*** 0.01 0.02 
Age (log)  0.06
** 0.03 0.02 
Employment (log)  0.37
*** 0.00 0.12 
PKM  (log)  –0.001 0.31 0.00 
Size1 * lost days (log)  –0.14
*** 0.00  –0.04 
Size2 * lost days (log)  –0.04  0.14  –0.01 
Size4 * lost days (log)  0.001  0.99  0.00 
Size5 * lost days (log)  –0.06
** 0.05  –0.02 
Exporter 0.29
*** 0.00 0.10 
*** statistically significant at 1 percent level; ** statistically significant at 5 
percent level  
                                                 
19 The impact of industrial structure on own-generation is discussed in greater detail later in this paper.  
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The evidence thus suggests that generator 
ownership is greatly affected by firm 
characteristics, such as size, sector, corporate 
structure, and export orientation. Large firms that 
operate 24 hours per day are more likely than 
smaller firms to install backup generation 
capacity compared to smaller firms, which 
operate only during daylight hours and therefore 
are less affected by evening blackouts. Mining 
firms tend to require own power to keep 
elevators, air pumps, and other safety devices 
fully operational regardless of the power supply 
from public grid. Petroleum firms have very 
sensitive and delicate equipment that must be 
protected from damage stemming from power 
outages. Exporters may need to generate their own power to meet ISO standards (e.g., relating to cold 
chains). Informal firms may be unable to accumulate significant generating capacity because of security 
concerns, which may include police raids, unstable land or lease tenure, and other factors.  
Figure 22  Probability that a firm will own a generator, by 
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Source: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Database. 
The composite effect of size and reliability of power supply is generally not significant across firms, 
except for small firms and microenterprises (table 3). The significant negative coefficient on the product 
of small firms and large power outages indicates that small firms suffer the most from unreliable power 
supply, since they lack the resources to invest in  own generation.
20  
5    The costs and benefits of  own generation 
Costs 
We use the revealed preference approach to analyze the economic costs of  own generation.
21 This 
approach is based on the presumption that rational, profit-maximizing firms will insure themselves 
against the risk of frequent power outages. Because insurance contracts for unreliable power supply are 
not available in developing countries, the only way to minimize losses is to acquire backup generating 
power. The firm’s problem is to choose the optimal amount of backup power that minimizes the sunk 
costs incurred by acquiring generation capacity as well as the damage that unsupplied power would cause.  
A competitive, risk-neutral firm will maximize expected profits by equating at the margin the 
expected cost of generating a kWh of its own power to the expected gain due to that kWh. That gain 
consists of the continued production (even if partial) that the self-generated electricity makes possible, 
                                                 
20 Further discussion of this subject becomes complicated because access to electricity and access to finance are 
frequently simultaneous. For example, in Nigeria small firms may lack internal funds to obtain a generator, and 
owning a generator may be a prerequisite to secure loan from the bank.  
21 See earlier citations to the revealed preference approach in the first section of this paper.  
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and the avoided damage to equipment that would have been caused by a power failure. Under profit-
maximizing conditions, the expected marginal gain from a self-generated kWh is also the expected 
marginal loss from the kWh that is not supplied by the utility. Therefore the marginal cost of self-
generated power may serve as an estimate for the marginal cost of an outage. 
The cost to the firm of generating its own power consists of two elements. The first is the yearly 
capacity cost of the generator and other capital outlays. Following earlier literature, that cost will be 
denoted by b(Kg), where Kg is the generator’s capacity measured in kW. The second is the variable cost 
per kWh—chiefly fuel cost, which is practically constant.
22 If the generator is used to capacity during 
power cuts, the variable cost per year will then bev H  Kg , where v is the fuel cost per kWh, and H is 
the expected total duration of outages, measured in hours per year. The total expected yearly cost per kW 
of backup generating power is then 
   C(Kg)  b(Kg) v H  Kg         ( 2 )  
The expected respective marginal cost is 
     C (Kg)   b (Kg) v H ,         ( 3 )  
and the expected marginal cost of a kWh generated is simply given by 
   
 C (Kg)kWh 
 b (Kg)
H
 v         ( 4 )  
Applying equation (4) to the enterprise survey data allows us (using reasonable assumptions) to 
estimate the (marginal) cost of  own generation from observed information about the acquisition and 
running costs of in-house generating capacity, and from data on the frequency of power outages.
23 For 
these purposes, values for b’, H, and v must be obtained.  
 The operating cost, v, is calculated as a product of the unit cost of fuel and the generator’s fuel 
efficiency (fuel consumption per kWh). Assuming that most firms in the enterprise survey dataset rely on 
thermal generation, the unit cost of fuel is approximated by an average price per liter of diesel fuel.
24 Fuel 
efficiency data was obtained from the Web sites of leading manufacturers of generators.
25 Fuel efficiency 
improves sharply after graduating from the smallest generators but becomes almost flat once capacity 
reaches 100MW (figure 23). The estimated operating costs and capacities of in-house generators in 
Africa, gleaned from the enterprise surveys, are summarized in appendix 1, table 3.  
                                                 
22 This measure does not account for other variable costs, such as maintenance, wages, and salaries. 
23 This measure of marginal cost does not account for incomplete backup that may result in additional losses such as 
destruction of raw materials and damage to equipment. These losses are inversely related to the percentage of 
backup and the reliability of the firm’s backup equipment. 
24 The fuel prices came from GTZ International Fuel Prices 2005, available at http://www.gtz.de/fuelprices  
25 These manufacturers included Wärtsilä (http://wartsila.com) and Cummins (http://cumminspower.com).  
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The unit capital cost of self-generated 
electricity, b’, depends on price schedules for 
generators, tax and depreciation rules, and the 
interest rates. Original price schedules (in 
national currencies) and data on year of 
acquisition are reported in the enterprise 
surveys. We converted the original price 
schedules into current U.S. dollars. First, we 
deflated the price schedules, applying the 
corresponding value of the country’s GDP 
deflator and then converting into dollars at the 
prevailing exchange rate.
26 The data for capital 
cost per kW of installed capacity (in 2004 
dollars, assuming thermal generation, no tax 
rules, and an internal rate of return of 10 
percent
27) came from the World Bank’s energy department (2005).  
Figure 23  Capital and operating costs of diesel generators 
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Sources: World Bank’s energy department (2005); authors’ 
estimates. 
The capital cost per kW of installed generator capacity is nonlinear. It decreases up to 10MW 
threshold, and then rises sharply, reflecting the change in generating technology, before beginning to 
decrease again owing to economies of scale (see figure 24). The unit capital cost of own electricity was 
annualized assuming linear depreciation and an average generator life of 20 years. 
Our data on the duration of power outages, H, came from the enterprise surveys. Data on the average 
duration of power outages were generally not available. We assumed a value of eight hours per day.
28 
In most of the countries of Africa, the average cost of generating electricity in-house is significantly 
higher then the cost of electricity from the public grid (table 4). This finding reflects the differences in 
efficiency between the small backup generators used by commercial firms and the large plants that 
produce electricity for the public grid. The major exceptions are the countries in which fuel is heavily 
subsidized (Algeria, Arab Republic of Egypt, and Eritrea), where the average cost of self-generated 
electricity is close to the cost of the electricity from the public grid. 
                                                 
26 The GDP deflator and nominal exchange rates came from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database. Nominal exchange rates were adjusted for price volatility using the World Bank Atlas method. See 
http://econ.worldbank.org for more information.  
27 The results from the enterprise surveys show that most firms in Africa rely on internal rather than external 
financing. Therefore, given limited access to finance, the internal rate of return is preferred to interest rates.  
28 Other assumptions about the duration of power outages were considered, including 4 and 12 hours. It follows from 
equation 4 that under these assumptions the estimates of the unit capital cost of self-generated electricity will vary 
within the 50 percent confidence interval.  
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Table 4   The comparative costs of self-generated and publicly supplied electricity, and the effect of  own generation 







cost of own 
electricity (B) 
Average total 
cost of own 
electricity 
(C=A+B) 
Price of kWh 
purchased from 
public grid (D) 
Weighted 
average cost of 
electricity 
(E=∂C+(1-∂)D) 
Algeria 0.04  0.11  0.15  0.03
* 0.05 
Benin 0.36  0.10  0.46  0.12
* 0.27 
Burkina Faso
† 0.42  0.32  0.74  0.21
* 0.23 
Cameroon
† 0.41  0.04  0.46  0.12
* 0.16 
Cape Verde
† 0.46  0.04  0.50  0.17
* 0.26 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  0.04  0.26  0.30  0.04
* 0.12 
Eritrea  0.11  0.03 0.13 0.11 0.12 
Kenya  0.24  0.06 0.29 0.10 0.14 
Madagascar 0.31  0.08  0.39 — — 
Malawi 0.46  0.03  0.50  0.05
* 0.09 
Mali  0.26  0.26 0.52 0.17 0.21 
Mauritius 0.26  0.35  0.61  0.14
* 0.25 
Morocco 0.31  0.32  0.62  0.08
* 0.15 
Niger
† 0.36  0.04  0.41  0.23
* 0.26 
Senegal  0.25  0.09 0.34 0.16 0.18 
Senegal
††  0.28  0.40 0.68 0.16 0.30 
South  Africa  0.18  0.36 0.54 0.04 0.05 
Tanzania  0.25  0.04 0.29 0.09 0.13 
Uganda  0.35  0.09 0.44 0.09 0.14 
Zambia  0.27  0.18 0.45 0.04 0.06 
† Tourism industry (hotels and restaurants sector) only.  
†† Survey of informal sector  
∂ Share of total electricity consumption coming from own generation 
* Data not reported in the enterprise surveys (obtained from the public utilities).  
— = data not available. 
 
The second column of table 4 reports the first term of equation (4), the estimated average capital cost 
of self-generated electricity, adjusted by the frequency of power outages. As might be expected, the 
average capital cost of self-generated electricity is higher in countries with a reliable power supply 
(Egypt, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa), and in the informal sector, which uses inefficient low-
capacity generators (Senegal).  
The third column of table 4 shows the average total cost of self-generated electricity, calculated as a 
sum of the average capital cost and the average variable costs. Overall, the average total cost of self-
generated electricity is about five times the price of electricity purchased from the public grid and can be 
as much as ten times more (in Malawi, South Africa, and Zambia). Eritrea is the only country in which 
the average total cost of self-generated electricity is comparable to the price of purchasing electricity from 
the public grid.  
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The last column of table 4 shows the weighted average cost of consumed energy, taking into account 
the share of self-generated electricity reported in the enterprise surveys.
29 It can be seen that while the 
average total cost of  own generation is very high, its effect on the weighted average cost of power for 
most countries is not very large, owing to limited use of  own generation. The impact of own-generation 
costs is higher in countries where electricity from public utilities is subsidized (Egypt, Malawi, Morocco), 
where the supply of public power is reliable (Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco), and where the share of  own 
generation is large (Benin, informal sector in Senegal).  
Benefits  
Our analysis of the economic benefits of  own generation takes two paths. The first follows the 
literature on the reliability of electricity supply (see, for example, Kariuki and Allan 1995) and computes 
the value of lost load, defined as the value an average consumer puts on an unsupplied kWh of energy. 
The value of lost load is represented by the customer damage function  
   y  f (X)           ( 5 )  
According to equation (5), the value of lost load (y) measured in dollars per hour depends on variety 
of parameters (X), including costs and frequency of outages, seasonal characteristics, and advance notice. 
Because data on seasonal characteristics and advance notice were not available, the lost load value was 
based on the costs and frequency of power outages. Lost load values were computed separately for firms 
with and without their own generators. For firms owning a generator the lost load value was calculated as 
 y  v Kg ,           ( 6 )  
 where v is the generator’s operational cost (in dollars per kWh), as described earlier, and Kg is 





,           ( 7 )  
 where Z is reported sales lost from power outages and t is reported frequency of power outages, 
multiplied by their average duration.
30 The economic benefit of owning a generator is thus expressed as 
the reduced loss per interrupted kW. The average values of lost load for firms with and without generators 
are reported in table 5. In all countries, except Uganda, the lost load is considerably higher for firms 
without a generator, especially in countries with infrequent (Mauritius, South Africa) or costly (Malawi) 
power outages.  
The second way to determine the benefit of  own generation is to estimate the marginal benefit of 
owning a generator by regressing the percentage of sales lost from power outages against the duration of 
power outages, generator ownership, and salient characteristics of countries and firms.
31 Selected 
                                                 
29 This indicator is based on the assumption that the electricity tariffs charged by the utilities are set according to 
marginal-cost pricing schedules.  
30 Power outages were assumed to last eight hours on average.  
31 An attempt to estimate the marginal benefit of owning a generator with respect to physical capital losses on a 
smaller sample of firms did not yield significant results. For details, see appendix 1, table 5.  
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estimated parameters of such a regression are reported in table 6; the complete set of parameters appears 
in appendix 1, table 4. The estimated parameters are jointly statistically significant (the p-value associated 
with the computed F-statistic is less than 0.01), and account for 20 percent of the variance in the response 
variable. As expected, the sign of the coefficient for duration of power outages is negative and significant, 
and the sign of the coefficient for generator ownership is positive and significant. The size of the 
estimated coefficient for generator ownership suggests that, when controlling for other factors, owning a 
generator decreases losses from power outages by approximately 1 percent of a firm’s sales.  
 
Table 5  Losses due to outages (“lost load”) for 









Algeria 155.8  52.2 
Benin 38.4  23.1 
Burkina Faso
† 114.1  13.0 
Cameroon
† 403.6  12.3 
Cape Verde
† 177.7  36.4 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  201.5  30.4 
Eritrea 31.9  10.2 
Kenya 113.1  37.1 
Madagascar 434.5  153.0 
Malawi 917.3  401.4 
Mali 390.3  9.5 
Mauritius 468.6  13.9 
Morocco 377.5  22.9 
Niger
† 81.3  22.6 
Senegal 166.0  19.2 
Senegal
†† 12.9  1.9 
South Africa  1140.1  66.1 
Tanzania —  444.3 
Uganda 27.6  191.4 
Zambia 286.6  39.2 
† Survey of tourism sector; †† Survey of informal 
sector. — = data not available. 
 
Table 6  Marginal benefit of owning a generator  
Reduction in lost sales 
Variable 
Estimated 
coefficient  P-value 
Days of power outages 
(log) 1.94
*** 0.00 
Generator ownership  –1.16
*** 0.01 




2  0.21  
N  4,254  
*** statistically significant at 1 percent level. 
Costs vs. benefits  
With no improvement in quality of public power supply  
Here we summarize the costs and benefits of  own generation by integrating them at the firm level, 
assuming no improvement in quality of public power supply. The costs are computed as the sum of the 
annualized fixed costs of acquiring a generator and the net annual operating costs of generation. The fixed 
costs of  own generation were annualized assuming linear depreciation. The net annual operating costs 
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were calculated as the product of the firm’s consumption of self-generated electricity and the difference 
between the costs per kWh of self-generated electricity and of electricity from the public grid.
32 
The benefits of  own generation were computed as the product of the share of firms owning a 
generator and the marginal benefit of owning a generator, as estimated from the regression analysis 
discussed in the previous section.
33 Both costs and benefits of owning a generator are expressed as 
percentages of sales. The resulting difference between the benefits and costs of  own generation (the 
benefit-cost margin) was tested for statistical significance from zero using the Student’s t test. The results 
are summarized in tables 7a–c below.  
In five countries (Benin, Egypt, Eritrea, Morocco, and Zambia), the costs of  own generation 
significantly outweigh the benefits (table 7a). Only in Mali and Mauritius do the benefits outweigh the 
costs. In most cases the negative difference between benefits and costs is not statistically significant from 
zero, implying that investment in in-house generation allows firms to break even. 












Algeria 3.12  —  —  0.26  . 
Benin 0.43  1.62  2.05  0.22  –1.83
** 
Egypt 2.34  0.86  3.20  0.21  –2.99
*** 
Eritrea 1.54  0.41  1.95  0.48  –1.47
** 
Kenya  0.14 — —  0.80 — 
Madagascar  0.28 — —  0.21 — 
Malawi 0.09  0.78  0.87  0.52  –0.35 
Mali  0.31 0.17 0.48 0.56 0.08 
Mauritius 0.17  0.01  0.18  0.54  0.36
*** 
Morocco 0.06  0.39  0.45  0.18  –0.27
** 
Senegal 0.32  0.50  0.82  0.70  –0.12 
Senegal
††  0.98 — —  0.13 — 
South Africa  0.10  0.09  0.19  0.13  –0.06 
Tanzania 0.43  1.01  0.94  0.47  –0.47 
Uganda 0.45  0.49  0.94  0.45  –0.49 
Zambia 3.02  0.95  3.96  0.26  –3.70
** 
†† Survey of informal sector. 
*** statistically significant at 1 percent level.  
** statistically significant at 5 percent level. 
— = data not available. 
Under less restrictive assumptions than those used so far, the benefits of  own generation can 
compensate for the losses even for countries where the difference between benefits and costs is negative 
and statistically significant. First, the fixed costs of  own generation can be sunk or depreciated 
                                                 
32 Total consumption of  self-generated electricity was estimated using the “electricity approach” discussed in 
appendix 2. 
33 This measure probably represents a lower bound estimate of the own-generation benefits given the various 
considerations not related to reliability of power supply as described in section 4 of this paper.  
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nonlinearly. In three of these countries (Egypt, Eritrea, and Zambia) the result is driven by fixed costs.
34 
Second, the analysis presented above does not account for other potential gains from  own generation, 
such as reductions in damaged equipment. This is especially important in Benin, where the average losses 
from damaged equipment account for 1.5 percent of sales.
35 Third, the results of the analysis do not 
incorporate the option value of lost load due to future shocks to power supply (e.g. unexpected draughts 
or power infrastructure damages).
36 
The costs and benefits of  own generation differ according to firm size (table 7b). The total costs of  
own generation vary nonlinearly by firm size, being most efficient for medium-sized firms. For small 
firms  own generation imposes relatively low fixed costs but higher variable costs. Larger firms have 
relatively high fixed costs, and increasing variable costs. The total benefits of  own generation increase 
linearly with firm size, reflecting the higher share of generator owners among larger firms. The difference 
between the costs and benefits of  own generation is negative across all size categories but is statistically 
significant only for small and very large firms. The difference is insignificant or marginally significant for 
microenterprises, medium, and large firms.  












Micro  0.49 0.67 1.16 0.17  –0.62 
Small  1.19 0.51 1.71 0.24  –1.24
*** 
Medium  0.43 0.36 0.78 0.44  –0.35
* 
Large  1.64 0.77 2.41 0.50  –2.10
* 
Very  large  1.20 1.22 2.42 0.60  –2.01
** 
*** statistically significant at 1 percent level. 
** statistically significant at 5 percent level. 
* statistically significant at 10 percent level.  
 
The costs of  own generation vary significantly across industries (table 7c). The costs are highest in 
chemicals, nonmetal and plastic materials, and mining, and lowest in light industries, such as textiles and 
wood. Chemicals and construction have the highest fixed costs of  own generation, whereas nonmetal and 
plastic materials and mining have the highest operational costs. The highest gains from  own generation 
are observed in mining, construction, and food and beverages. The difference between the costs and 
benefits of  own generation is negative across all industries, but the result is not statistically significant or 
just marginally significant, except for food and beverages and textiles.  
                                                 
34 The difference between the gains from own-generation and the net operational costs of own-generation is positive 
for Eritrea.  
35 See appendix 1, table 2a. 
36 The authors thank David Newberry for making this point.  
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Textiles 0.42  0.29  0.71  0.23  –0.48
** 
Food and beverages  0.79  0.77  1.56  0.53  –1.03
*** 
Metals and machinery  1.08  0.13  1.21  0.26  –0.95
* 
Chemicals 2.92  0.14  3.06  0.43  –2.63 
Construction 2.08  0.46  2.54  0.57  –1.97 
Wood and furniture  0.42  0.37  0.79  0.20  –0.59 
Nonmetallic and plastic materials   0.91  2.30  3.20  0.36  –2.84
* 
Mining and quarrying  0.11  3.10  3.22  0.62  –2.60 
Source: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Database. 
*** statistically significant at 1 percent level.  
** statistically significant at 5 percent level.  
* statistically significant at 10 percent level.  
 
With improvements in quality of public power supply  
 The results of the probit model discussed earlier can be used to evaluate the extent to which an 
improvement in the reliability of power supply will affect generator ownership. The marginal effects of 
the probit model (equation 1) suggest that the probability of a firm’s owning a generator is not very 
sensitive to power supply reliability. Reducing power outages by half the mean outage reduces generator 
ownership by less than 2 percent (table 8). It appears that thoroughly reliable power would reduce 
generator ownership by no more than 12 percent.  
Table 8  Simulated change in generator ownership 
Change in probability that firm will own a generator 
Variable Mean  Min>Max  ½ mean change  ½ std change 
Days of power outages  37.9  0.12  0.02  0.03 
Age   18.3  0.16  0.02  0.02 
Employment   111.7  0.87  0.12  0.16 
Exporter 0.19  0.10  n.a.  n.a. 
Source: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Database. 
Note. Exporter is a binary variable, therefore ½ mean change and ½ std change statistics are not reported.  
n.a. = not applicable. 
 
The predictions of the probit regression are extended to individual countries in appendix 1, table 6. 
Raising the reliability of power supply to the level of South Africa results in a mere 3–5 percent reduction 
in generator ownership. 
Although the regression results suggest that improving the reliability of power supply would have a 
relatively small effect on generator ownership, there are several reasons to expect that the effect would be 
greater. First, the regression analysis does not account for unobserved explanatory variables, such as 
firms’ access to finance and productivity, which may bias the regression results downward. Second, 
because investment in in-house generation is irreversible, reductions in generator ownership will occur 
with a lag as public power supply is improved. The cross-sectional data analysis conducted in this study 
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does not capture these dynamics. Third, the gains to be had by improving the reliability of power supply 
may be greater if the effects of unreliable power supply on observed industrial structure and external 
competitiveness are taken into account. Because energy-intensive industries require more stable power 
supplies, improving reliability will diversify country’s production base and result in additional economic 
gains.  
6    Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper aims to deepen our understanding of the widespread phenomenon of own generation of 
electric power by firms, as well as its relationship to unreliable public power supplies in the African 
context. It does so by triangulating across a number of different sources of evidence covering more than 
26 countries across Africa. First, the UDI World Electric Power Plants database provides a detailed 
inventory of (at least the largest cases of) own generation at the country level, giving an impression of the 
overall extent of the own generation phenomenon. Second, the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey Database 
provides a detailed set of attitudinal and behavioral information about decisions relating to own power 
generation at the firm level; at least for the case of larger formal sector manufacturing enterprises. Third, 
both sources are complemented by engineering data from generator manufacturers and other sector 
sources that help to capture the cost structure of generating power on-site. 
Overall, own generation by firms accounts for about 6 percent of installed generation capacity in Sub-
Saharan Africa adding an additional 4,000 MW to the total available plant. However, this share doubles to 
around 12 percent in the low-income countries, the post-conflict countries, and more generally on the 
Western side of the continent. Moreover, there emerge around a dozen countries for which own 
generation represents more than 10 percent of their installed generation capacity, and even more than 20 
percent in some cases (DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Swaziland). Moreover, in these 
cases the value of the capital stock tied-up in own-generation assets can be as high as 4 percent of one 
year’s national income or 20 percent of one year’s gross domestic fixed capital formation. Relative to 
generation plant owned by public utilities, on-site generation tends to be smaller in scale (by as much as 
an order of magnitude), and much more heavily skewed towards diesel and gas as opposed to coal and 
hydro. Historic trends suggest that the growth in  own generation has been particularly high in recent 
years. 
The decision of a firm to maintain its own-generation capability is driven by a variety of factors. In 
firm surveys, firms in countries reporting more than 60 days of power outages per year tend to identify 
power as a major constraint to doing business, and present relatively high rates of generator ownership. 
However, more rigorous empirical analysis shows that unreliable public power supplies is far from being 
the only or the largest factor driving generator ownership. Firm characteristics such as size, age, industrial 
sector and export orientation all have a major influence. In particular, the probability owning a generator 
doubles in large firms relative to small ones. Moreover, the behavioral model predicts that the percentage 
of firms owning their own generators would remain high (at around 20 percent) even if power supplies 
were perfectly reliable, suggesting that other factors such as emergency driven back-up requirements or 
export driven quality regulations play a critical role in the decision to own a generator. 
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The costs of  own generation are high, driven mainly by the variable cost of diesel fuel. In most cases 
they fall in the range US$0.30-0.70 per kilowatt-hour, which is often three times as high as the price of 
purchasing electricity from the public grid; although the latter is typically subsidized. Nevertheless, in 
most cases, this does not hugely affect the overall weighted average cost of power to firms given that  
own generation is only used during a relatively small percentage of the working year. 
At the same time, the survey evidence shows that the benefits of generator ownership are also 
substantial. Considering only lost sales resulting from periods of power outages, firms with their own 
generators report a value of lost load of typically less than US$50 per hour, which is only a fraction of the 
value of lost load in excess of US$150 per hour that is reported by firms in the same country that do not 
have their own generators. 
Nevertheless, when costs and benefits are considered side by side, the balance is not found to be 
significantly positive; a pattern which holds across countries, industrial sectors, and business scales. This 
may simply be because the analysis is only able to capture one dimension of the benefits of generator 
ownership – namely reduction in lost sales – but fails to capture many other important aspects – such as 
reduced damage to equipment, higher quality of production, and meeting reliability criterion for access to 
export markets. 
A number of policy implications emerge from these findings. 
First, while the overall scale of  own generation in Africa is not that substantial overall, it plays a very 
important in a number of countries in the region, including some of the larger countries (to wit DRC and 
Nigeria). This suggests that there may be some strategic value for these countries to think about the role 
that this significant additional generating capacity could play in national power supply. In many countries, 
own-generators are not allowed to sell power into the grid, even though this could make a valuable 
contribution to improving the availability of power in the country as a whole. 
Second, while improvements in the reliability of public power supplies would reduce the extent to 
which own generators were used and hence the level of variable costs incurred, it would in many cases 
not alter the firm’s basic decision to maintain its own back-up generation facilities. The reason is that 
there are other important motivations for holding these assets, including meeting international quality 
standards for participation in export markets, and dealing with critical sensitivities in the production 
process (for example, maintaining ventilation of mines). 
Third, through own generation the majority of large formal sector enterprises are able to effectively 
insulate themselves from the impact of unreliable power supplies. Although the cost of running such 
generators is high (typically US$0.25–0.45 per kilowatt-hour), given that outages are only intermittent, 
the overall impact on the weighted average cost of power supply to these firms is relatively small: of the 
order of a few cents per kilowatt-hour. The major victims of unreliable power supply are in the informal 
sector, where the limited survey evidence available suggests that generator ownership is an order of 
magnitude less prevalent than in the formal sector. The other major casualties are the formal sector firms 
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Appendix 1    Electrical generating capacity in Sub-
Saharan Africa 

































Algeria 11.47  12.32  5.28  —  29.49  6.22  322  — 
Benin  69.23  56.12  7.79  1.54 26.90 32.80  35  — 
Botswana  9.65  22.29  1.54  — 14.91 17.57  —  — 
Burkina  Faso  68.97 7.82 3.87  —  29.82  6.52  31  — 
Burundi  79.56  143.76  11.75  — 39.22 25.28  —  — 
Cameroon 64.94  15.80  4.92  —  57.79  7.62  25  — 
Cape  Verde  70.69  15.18  6.87  — 43.10 13.53  23  — 
Egypt 26.46  10.40  6.12  —  19.26  5.87  353  — 
Eritrea 37.66  74.61  5.95  —  43.04  9.31  103  0.11 
Ethiopia 42.45  44.16  5.44  —  17.14  1.58  —  0.06 
Kenya  48.15  53.40  9.35  0.34 73.40 15.16  78  0.10 
Madagascar 41.30  54.31  7.92  0.91  21.50  2.23  190  — 
Malawi  60.38 63.21 22.64  —  49.06  4.44  50  — 
Mali  24.18 5.97 2.67  1.36  45.33  5.09  43  0.17 
Mauritania  29.66  37.97  2.06  — 26.25 11.75  —  — 
Mauritius  12.68 5.36 4.01  0.42  39.51  2.87  37  — 
Morocco  8.94 3.85 0.82  —  13.81  11.16  58  — 
Namibia  15.09 0.00 1.20  —  13.21  13.33  —  — 
Niger  26.09 3.93 2.72  —  27.54  14.74  73  — 
Senegal 30.65  25.64  5.12  0.62  62.45  6.71  31  0.16 
South  Africa  8.96 5.45 0.92  —  9.45  0.17  64  0.04 
Swaziland  21.43  32.38  1.98  — 35.71 10.33  —  — 
Tanzania  60.24  63.09  —  0.81 59.05 12.28  70  0.09 
Uganda 43.85  45.50  6.06  0.74  38.34  6.56  31  0.09 
Zambia 39.61  25.87  4.54  0.28  38.16  5.13  51  0.04 
              
Conflict 51.52  53.91  7.74  73.93  24.06  5.56  50  0.08 
Nonconflict 29.99  21.79  6.22  65.90  28.58  6.74  125  0.09 
Source: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Database. 
Note: — = data not available. 
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Agroindustry 40.15  35.10  5.26  0.65  57.14  10.92 48  0.10 
Beverages 37.04  42.10  3.33  —  55.56  3.35  79  0.06 
Chemicals 26.02  27.52  5.26  0.40  39.71  6.90  138  0.09 
Construction 29.17  26.31  4.78  0.61  47.11  10.85  138  0.11 
Electronics 8.89  5.59  0.39 —  33.33  3.35  75  0.07 
Food 43.09  29.24  8.83  0.31  31.85  8.61  133  0.06 
Garments 28.78  25.11  7.88  0.42  13.54  5.92  98  0.08 
IT services  24.24  23.07  2.78  —  18.75  0.69  —  — 
Leather 17.14  22.59  4.43  0.84  14.35  3.14  192  0.08 
Metals and 
machinery 29.06  21.60  6.93  0.92  25.36  4.57  154  0.09 
Mining 40.91  20.24  2.80  0.20  45.45  15.50  10  0.03 
Nonmetallic 
and plastic 
products 28.16  21.24  6.97  0.65  29.45  7.39  201  0.08 
Paper 34.41  26.08  6.37  0.62  28.74  4.66  80  0.09 
Retail and 
wholesale 29.90  12.80  3.78  0.86  6.25  1.43 .  0.05 
Textiles 32.49  18.96  7.17  0.43  20.67  5.15  127  0.09 
Wood and 
furniture 39.65  32.84  5.36  1.01  16.00  3.39  58  0.08 
Source: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Database.    Note: — = data not available. 
 
Table 1c  Summary statistics from the enterprise survey data, by size of firm 
































< 10  42.43  28.16  9.21  1.47  9.75  3.65  51  0.10 
10–50   31.68  26.18  6.06  0.75  24.05  4.97  112  0.10 
50–100   26.00  28.22  5.03  0.48  38.73  8.00  112  0.08 
100–250   26.24  25.27  5.36  0.40  41.07  8.56  128  0.07 
> 250   30.02  28.81  4.25  0.38  51.54  11.49  160  0.06 
Source: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Database. 
 































Nonexporter   32.08  31.13  5.90  0.72  26.07  5.36  130  0.08 
Exporter 26.36  23.57  4.22  0.48  37.52  9.36  99  0.08 
Source: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Database. 
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Domestic 28.14  25.63  5.74  0.72  26.09  5.33  133  0.09 
Foreign 32.08  37.43  5.80  0.51  47.73  9.48  80  0.08 
Source: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Database. 
 













Power from own 
generator (%) 
Manufacturing 68.63  8.20  3.87 24.00  6.51 
Burkina Faso 
Tourism   71.43  2.67  —  71.43  6.60 
Manufacturing 80.79  137.41  11.30 39.22  25.28 
Burundi 
Tourism 73.33  170.48  13.56  —  — 
Manufacturing 65.55  8.60  4.92 61.34  6.89 
Cameroon 
Tourism 62.86  33.50  —  45.71  12.84 
Manufacturing 65.96  10.60  6.87 34.04  9.98 
Tourism 90.91  24.67  —  81.82  34.38  Cape Verde 
Informal   55.77  6.25  8.69  —  — 
Manufacturing 48.15  52.35  9.32 70.86  14.90 
Tourism .  62.00  9.65  94.12  17.54  Kenya 
Informal 75.00  7.68  31.31  3.36  34.86 
Manufacturing 60.38  63.21  22.64 49.06  4.44 
Malawi 
Informal 44.83  9.39  22.53  —  — 
Manufacturing 28.57  38.12  2.02 26.25  11.75 
Mauritania 
Tourism 36.36  37.16  2.28  —  — 
Manufacturing 21.60  3.90  2.72 24.80  14.59 
Niger 
Tourism 69.23  4.60  —  53.85  15.42 
Manufacturing 30.65  25.64  5.12 62.45  6.71 
Senegal 
Informal 42.74  2.92  5.67  10.57  29.44 
Manufacturing 8.97  5.44  0.92 9.47  0.17 
South Africa 
Informal   17.17  0.71  —  —  — 
Manufacturing 58.89  59.64 — 55.35  12.28 
Tanzania 
Tourism 66.13  72.98  —  74.24  . 
Manufacturing 44.48  46.85  6.25 36.00  6.78 
Tourism 37.04  31.63  3.43  65.38  3.26  Uganda 
Informal 61.93  11.28  15.75  5.77  19.27 
Source: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Database. 
Note: — = data not available. 
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Table 2  Probit regression results (generator ownership) 
Variable Estimated Coeff. P-value Elasticity
Days of Power Outages (log) 0.06 0.01 0.02
Age (log) 0.06 0.03 0.02
Employment (log) 0.37 0.00 0.12
PKM (log) -0.001 0.31 0.00
Size1 * Lost Days (log) -0.14 0.00 -0.04
Size2 * Lost Days (log) -0.04 0.14 -0.01
Size4 * Lost Days (log) 0.001 0.99 0.00
Size5 * Lost Days (log) -0.06 0.05 -0.02
Exporter 0.29 0.00 0.10
Algeria 1.53 0.00 0.55
Benin 1.57 0.00 0.57
Botswana 1.09 0.00 0.41
Burkina Faso 1.43 0.00 0.53
Burundi 2.37 0.00 0.71
Cameroon 2.17 0.00 0.69
Cape Verde 2.11 0.00 0.68
Egypt 0.98 0.00 0.35
Eritrea 1.62 0.00 0.58
Ethiopia 1.2 0.00 0.45
Kenya 2.47 0.00 0.73
Madagascar 0.91 0.00 0.34
Malawi 1.49 0.00 0.54
Mali 2.16 0.00 0.69
Mauritania 1.5 0.00 0.55
Mauritius 1.53 0.00 0.56
Namibia 0.89 0.01 0.34
Niger 1.69 0.00 0.60
Senegal 2.42 0.00 0.73
Swaziland 1.37 0.00 0.51
Tanzania 2.24 0.00 0.70
Uganda 1.8 0.00 0.63
Zambia 1.14 0.00 0.43
Food and beverages 0.8 0.00 0.28
Metals and machinery 0.32 0.00 0.11
Chemicals and pharmaceutics 0.65 0.00 0.24
Construction 0.68 0.00 0.25
Wood and furniture 0.19 0.03 0.06
Non-metallic, plastic materials 0.61 0.00 0.22
Other manufacturing 0.52 0.00 0.19
Other services 0.18 0.65 0.06
Hotels and restaurants 1.11 0.00 0.42
Mining and quarrying 0.53 0.11 0.19
Constant -4 0.00 0.02  
Source: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Database. 
Note: Base country: South Africa; base industry: Textiles 
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Table 3  Operating costs of  own generation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Price of kwh 
Country 
Fuel price 
(USc/l)  <5kVA 5–100kVA  100kVA–1MW  1MW–10MW Grid 
Algeria    0.10 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.03  0.03
* 
Benin    0.72 0.58 0.32 0.22 0.19  0.12
* 
Botswana    0.61 0.49 0.27 0.18 0.16  0.04
* 
Burkina  Faso    0.94 0.75 0.42 0.28 0.25  0.21
* 
Burundi    1.08 0.86 0.49 0.32 0.29  n.a. 
Cameroon    0.83 0.66 0.37 0.25 0.22  0.12
* 
Cape  Verde    0.81 0.65 0.36 0.24 0.22  0.17
* 
Egypt    0.10 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.03  0.04
* 
Eritrea  0.25 0.20 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.11 
Ethiopia    0.32 0.26 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.06 
Kenya    0.56 0.45 0.25 0.17 0.15 0.10 
Madagascar    0.79 0.63 0.36 0.24 0.21  n.a. 
Malawi    0.88 0.70 0.40 0.26 0.24  0.05
* 
Mali    0.55 0.44 0.25 0.17 0.15 0.17 
Mauritania    0.59 0.47 0.27 0.18 0.16  n.a. 
Mauritius    0.56 0.45 0.25 0.17 0.15  0.14
* 
Morocco    0.70 0.56 0.32 0.21 0.19  0.08
* 
Namibia    0.65 0.52 0.29 0.20 0.18  0.04
* 
Niger    0.91 0.73 0.41 0.27 0.25  0.23
* 
Senegal    0.53 0.42 0.24 0.16 0.14 0.16 
South  Africa    0.40 0.32 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.04 
Swaziland    0.73 0.58 0.33 0.22 0.20  0.05
* 
Tanzania    0.61 0.49 0.27 0.18 0.16 0.09 
Uganda    0.70 0.56 0.32 0.21 0.19 0.09 
Zambia    0.60 0.48 0.27 0.18 0.16 0.04 
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Table 4  Marginal benefit of generator ownership (lost sales) 
Variable Estimated  Coeff.  P-value 
Days of Power Outages (log)  1.94 0.00 
Generator Ownership  -1.16 0.01 
Algeria 2.20  0.04 
Benin 0.74  0.56 
Botswana -3.31  0.09 
Burkina Faso  0.56  0.79 
Burundi 3.24  0.03 
Cameroon 1.21  0.39 
Cape Verde  1.85  0.36 
Egypt 2.12  0.03 
Eritrea -1.21  0.45 
Ethiopia -0.70  0.52 
Kenya 3.62  0.00 
Kenya (informal)  28.68  0.00 
Madagascar 1.70  0.14 
Malawi 15.76  0.00 
Mali 0.60  0.68 
Mauritania -3.39  0.03 
Mauritius 1.78  0.19 
Morocco -0.95  0.41 
Namibia -3.24  0.18 
Niger -0.64  0.75 
Senegal 0.84  0.48 
Senegal (informal)  3.75  0.01 
South Africa  -1.25  0.25 
Swaziland -3.01  0.09 
Uganda 0.54  0.63 
Uganda (informal)  10.63  0.00 
Agroindustry 0.84  0.13 
Metals And Machinery  2.20  0.00 
Chemicals And Pharmaceutics  0.18  0.81 
Construction -0.08  0.94 
Wood And Furniture  0.04  0.94 
Non-Metallic And Plastic Materials  1.02  0.15 
Other Manufacturing  0.06  0.95 
Other Services  1.80  0.34 
Hotels And Restaurants  1.69  0.39 
Mining And Quarrying  -0.77  0.79 
Micro 1.40  0.05 
Small 0.85  0.12 
Large 0.96  0.17 
Very Large  -0.16  0.82 
Constant   -1.71  0.11 
F-Statistic  26.25 0.00 
R
2  0.21  
N  4254   
Source: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Database. 
Note: Base country: Zambia; base industry: textiles; base size category: medium size (50–100 employees). 
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Table 5  Marginal benefit of generator ownership (damage to physical capital) 
Variable Estimated  coefficient  P-value 
Days of power outages (log)  0.05  0.15 
Generator ownership  0.03  0.79 
Benin 0.73  0.00 
Kenya -0.11  0.51 
Madagascar 0.70  0.00 
Mali 0.65  0.01 
Mauritius 0.21  0.34 
Senegal 0.26  0.11 
Uganda 0.22  0.24 
Agroindustry 0.15  0.32 
Metals and machinery  0.21  0.24 
Chemicals and pharmaceutics  0.01  0.95 
Construction 0.06  0.76 
Wood and furniture  0.14  0.41 
Non-metallic and plastic materials  0.18  0.43 
Other manufacturing  0.62  0.02 
Mining and quarrying  0.09  0.82 
Small 0.79  0.00 
Medium 0.21  0.12 
Large 0.00  0.98 
Very large  -0.13  0.43 
Constant 0.001  0.99 
F-Statistic  6.06 0.00 
R
2  0.2  
N  540  
Note: Base country: Zambia; base industry: textiles; base size category: medium size (50–100 employees), 
Source: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Database. 
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Table 6  Simulated change in generator ownership from improved reliability of power supply  




ownership (no power 
outages) 
Simulated generator 
ownership (outages at 
South African average) 
Algeria  13.96 0.28 0.21 0.25 
Benin  74.73 0.20 0.11 0.14 
Botswana  24.86 0.19 0.11 0.13 
Burkina  Faso  20.42 0.26 0.17 0.20 
Burundi  130.09 0.44 0.32 0.36 
Cameroon  30.36 0.59 0.55 0.59 
Cape  Verde  27.30 0.46 0.39 0.43 
Egypt  17.23 0.18 0.12 0.14 
Eritrea  110.15 0.46 0.35 0.39 
Ethiopia  60.63 0.19 0.07 0.09 
Kenya  82.03 0.69 0.65 0.69 
Madagascar  74.15 0.19 0.11 0.13 
Malawi  76.88 0.46 0.36 0.40 
Mali  14.28 0.47 0.42 0.47 
Mauritania  65.65 0.27 0.16 0.19 
Mauritius  7.49 0.41 0.37 0.41 
Namibia  15.00 0.20 0.11 0.14 
Niger  38.35 0.41 0.34 0.38 
Senegal  29.15 0.61 0.56 0.60 
South  Africa  5.95 0.09 0.05 0.09 
Swaziland  34.87 0.38 0.27 0.30 
Tanzania  70.15 0.57 0.49 0.53 
Uganda  61.38 0.34 0.24 0.27 
Zambia  36.34 0.38 0.30 0.33 
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Table 7  Impact of power situation on observed industrial structure and foreign trade 
Country Key  exports 
Days of power 
outages 
Energy intensity




(ICA / DOE 
Index) 
Algeria Petroleum  13.99  5,441  0.99 
Benin  Cotton, meat, fruits  73.86  3,147  0.94 
Botswana Diamonds,  ores  24.56  4,319  1.00 
Burkina Faso  Cotton  20.08  1,095  0.96 
Burundi Coffee,  gold  143.76  1,739  0.98 
Cameroon Petroleum,  wood  30.05  1,871  0.96 
Cape Verde  Apparel  13.27  1,015  0.92 
Egypt Diverse  17.46  7,721  1.02 
Eritrea Sugar  93.89  3,255  1.07 
Ethiopia  Coffee, leather, vegetables  60.30  1,644  1.00 
Kenya  Oil, tea, vegetables  64.96  4,125  1.03 
Madagascar  Spices, fish   77.99  2,510  1.00 
Malawi Tobacco,  sugar  54.83  2,532  0.94 
Mali Gold  14.55  706  0.94 
Mauritania  Iron ore, fish, gold  48.28  10,710  0.98 
Mauritius Sugar,  apparel  7.76  2,767  0.97 
Morocco Diverse  7.28  2,996  1.07 
Namibia Fish,  gems  15.20  4,965  0.98 
Niger Uranium,  food  25.15  1,437  0.97 
Senegal Oil,  chemicals  18.64  3,402  0.94 
South Africa  Diverse  4.60  12,477  0.97 
Swaziland Chemicals,  apparel  35.11  4,573  1.00 
Tanzania  Gold, fish, coffee  72.27  3,466  0.96 
Uganda  Fish, gold, coffee  43.93  1,440  1.00 
Zambia  Copper nonferrous metals  37.21  11,773  0.95 
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Appendix 2    Methodologies for estimating average 
costs of self-generated electricity  
The results of the two approaches detailed below were not significantly different.  
Fuel approach   
Makes it possible to estimate the average cost of self-generated electricity without knowing the 
reported price of electricity from the public grid (which is missing for some countries).  
  Calculated annual fuel consumption by dividing reported fuel expenditures by fuel prices from 
country-level data from GTZ. 
  Calculated the ratio of average consumption of fuel for firms with and without generators by country, 
sector, and size.  
  Calculated the total amount and expenditures on fuel used for  own generation by multiplying annual 
fuel consumption on the ratio of average consumption of fuel for  own generation. 
  Calculated the total amount of self-generated electricity by multiplying the estimated amount of fuel 
used for  own generation by the generator’s fuel transformation coefficient as provided by electrical 
engineering experts (measured in liters per kWh).  
  Calculated the total amount of electricity consumed from public grid using the estimated amount of 
self-generated electricity and the reported share of electricity from public grid.  
  Calculated total expenditures on electricity from the public grid by multiplying estimated 
consumption from the public grid by the reported price of electricity from the public grid.  
  Calculated the average costs of electricity from  own generation and the electricity from public grid 
by dividing electricity expenditures by electricity consumption.  
Electricity approach 
Advantage of methodology: simple, requires fewer iterations, possibly more precise.  
  Calculated annual electricity consumption from public grid by dividing reported electricity 
expenditures by reported price of electricity from the public grid.  
  Calculated the total amount of self-generated electricity using the estimated amount of self-generated 
electricity and the reported share of electricity from the public grid.  
  Calculated the total expenditures on self-generated electricity by multiplying the estimated amount of 
self-generated electricity by the projected average cost of  own generation (the product of the 
generator’s fuel transformation coefficient and the fuel price).  
38 
 PAYING THE PRICE FOR UNRELIABLE POWER SUPPLIES:  




  Calculated the average costs of electricity from  own generation and electricity from the public grid 











This study is part of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD), a 
project designed to expand the world’s knowledge of physical infrastructure in 
Africa. AICD will provide a baseline against which future improvements in 
infrastructure services can be measured, making it possible to monitor the results 
achieved from donor support. It should also provide a more solid empirical 
foundation for prioritizing investments and designing policy reforms in the 
infrastructure sectors in Africa.  
AICD will produce a series of reports (such as this one) that provide an overview 
of the status of public expenditure, investment needs, and sector performance in 
each of the main infrastructure sectors, including energy, information and 
communication technologies, irrigation, transport, and water and sanitation. The 
World Bank will publish a summary of AICD’s findings in November 2009. The 
underlying data will be made available to the public through an interactive Web 
site allowing users to download customized data reports and perform simple 
simulation exercises. 
The first phase of AICD focuses on 24 countries that together account for 85 
percent of the gross domestic product, population, and infrastructure aid flows of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The countries are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, 
Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo), Côte d'Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zambia. Under a second phase of the project, coverage will be expanded to 
include additional countries. 
AICD is being implemented by the World Bank on behalf of a steering 
committee that represents the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), Africa’s regional economic communities, the African 
Development Bank, and major infrastructure donors. AICD grew from an idea 
presented at the inaugural meeting of the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, 
held in London in October 2005.  
Financing for AICD is provided by a multi-donor trust fund to which the main 
contributors are the Department for International Development (United 
Kingdom), the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, Agence Française 
de Développement, and the European Commission. A group of distinguished 
peer reviewers from policy making and academic circles in Africa and beyond 
reviews all of the major outputs of the study, with a view to assuring the 
technical quality of the work.  
This and other papers analyzing key infrastructure topics, as well as the 
underlying data sources described above, will be available for download from 
www.infrastructureafrica.org. Freestanding summaries are available in English 
and French. 
Inquiries concerning the availability of datasets should be directed to 
vfoster@worldbank.org. 
 
 